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Abstract	  
Recent	  studies	  in	  the	  anthropology	  of	  Islam	  have	  called	  for	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  the	  relationship	  
between	  global	  forms	  of	  Islam	  and	  local	  priorities,	  new	  ideologies	  and	  everyday	  religious	  experience.	  	  
This	   article	   addresses	   these	   concerns	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Uyghur	   society	   in	   the	   Xinjiang	   Uyghur	  
Autonomous	   Region	   of	   China	   where	   communities	   are	   increasingly	   engaging	   with	   transnational	  
currents	   of	   Islamic	   ideology,	   and	   increasingly	   under	   pressure	   from	   the	   state	   which	   conflates	  
religiosity	  with	  anti-­‐state	  activity	  and	  extremist	   terrorism.	   	  The	  article	   focuses	  on	   Islamic	  media,	   in	  
particular	  at	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  rural	  Uyghur	  women	  experience	  and	  reproduce	  globalized	  forms	  of	  
Islamic	  media.	  It	  aims	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  most	  marginalized	  sectors	  of	  society	  are	  engaging	  with	  
these	   changing	   religious	   ideologies	   and	   practices.	   The	   theoretical	   frame	   draws	   on	   notions	   of	   the	  
‘soundscape’,	   which	   explore	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   sound,	   practices	   of	   listening,	   and	   perceptions	   of	  




Snapshots	  in	  Sound	  from	  Xinjiang	  
The	  massive	  development	  of	  recent	  decades	  in	  the	  Xinjiang	  Uyghur	  Autonomous	  Region	  of	  China	  has	  
brought	   rapid	  advances	   in	   infrastructure,	   the	  wholesale	  extraction	  of	  natural	   resources,	  and	   large-­‐
scale	  Han	  Chinese	   immigration	   into	   a	   region	  once	  dominated	  by	  Turkic	  Muslim	  peoples,	   the	  most	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numerous	  of	  which	  are	   the	  Uyghurs.	  This	  development	  has	  wrought	  huge	  changes	  not	  only	   in	   the	  
landscape	  but	  also	  in	  the	  soundscape.	  The	  noise	  of	  heavy	  industry	  threatens	  at	  times	  to	  drown	  out	  
human	  sound.	  Coal	  mines	  and	  oil	   refineries	  now	  dominate	  the	  desert	   landscape,	  and	  heavy	   lorries	  
thunder	  up	  and	  down	  the	  new	  highways	  transporting	  minerals	  and	  building	  materials.	  The	  thud	  of	  
pile	  drivers	  echoes	  around	  the	  high-­‐rise	  residential	  developments	  that	  are	  shooting	  up	  in	  Xinjiang’s	  
provincial	   cities.	   In	   the	  Muslim	   cemetery	   in	  Ürümchi	   there	   is	   an	   audible	   hum	   from	   the	   electricity	  
pylons	  and	  the	  mass	  of	  wires	  that	  pass	  overhead;	  relatives	  complain	  that	  the	  noise	  is	  disturbing	  the	  
sleep	  of	  the	  dead.	  In	  the	  Uyghur	  villages,	  cement	  mixers	  grind	  as	  peasant	  farmers	  take	  advantage	  of	  
government	   grants	   to	   rebuild	   their	   homes;	   the	  nights	   throb	   to	   the	   sound	  of	  water	   pumps,	   as	   the	  
farmers	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  cheaper	  rate	  electricity	  to	  pump	  water	  to	  their	  cotton	  fields.	  	  
State	  media	  continues	  to	  claim	  its	  space	  in	  the	  Uyghur	  soundscape:	  another	  striking	  development	  in	  
2012	  was	  the	  return	  of	  the	  village	  loudspeaker,	  that	  supreme	  sonic	  marker	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Cultural	  
Revolution,	   once	   again	   broadcasting	   music	   –	   mainly	   Uyghur	   pop	   songs	   –	   and	   news:	   production	  
targets	   met	   and	   exceeded,	   and	   the	   latest	   regional	   and	   national	   political	   campaigns.	   In	   the	   Han-­‐
dominated	  public	   spaces	  of	  Xinjiang’s	  provincial	   cities,	   centred	  on	   the	  beautifully	  manicured	   town	  
squares	   (guangchang),	   the	   evening	   soundscape	   is	   transformed	   into	   a	   noisy	   carnival	   as	   urbanites	  
come	  out	  to	  enjoy	  forms	  of	  leisure	  characterized	  by	  ‘heat	  and	  noise’	  (renao):	  groups	  of	  middle-­‐aged	  
women	   enjoy	   American	   line	   dancing	   or	   Chinese	   yang’ge	   dancing	   to	   loud	   pop	   soundtracks	   which	  
compete	  with	  tinny	  music	  from	  children’s	  fairground	  rides,	  while	  elderly	  men	  stroll	  by	  holding	  radios	  
from	  which	  emanate	  the	  sounds	  of	  Chinese	  opera.	  	  
Attention	  to	  sound	  has	  become	  more	  mainstream	  in	  anthropological	  studies	  over	  the	  past	  decade,	  
intersecting	  with	  interests	  in	  the	  field	  of	  ethnomusicology	  (Erlmann	  2004).	  Stephen	  Feld	  has	  coined	  
the	   term	   ‘acoustemology’	   to	   describe	   ‘an	   exploration	   of	   sonic	   sensibilities,	   specifically	   of	   ways	   in	  
which	  sound	  is	  central	  to	  making	  sense,	  to	  knowing,	  to	  experiential	  truth’	  (Feld	  1996:	  97).	  A	  related	  
trend	  in	  anthropology	  and	  ethnomusicology	  builds	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘soundscape’,	  a	  term	  coined	  
in	   the	   1970s	   by	   Canadian	   composer	   Murray	   Schafer.	   Schafer’s	   projects	   can	   be	   linked	   to	   the	  
environmental	  concerns	  and	  anxieties	  of	  urbanisation	  and	  industrialisation	  that	  were	  current	  at	  the	  
time;	   anxieties	   that	   are	   certainly	   moot	   in	   contemporary	   Xinjiang.	   However	   more	   recent	   writing	  
around	  the	  idea	  works	  more	  broadly	  to	  create	  new	  possibilities	  for	  thinking	  about	  the	  links	  between	  
the	  social	  and	  physical	  environment,	  and	  for	  thinking	  about	  listening	  as	  a	  cultural	  practice	  (Samuels	  
et	  al.	  2010:	  330).	  
What	  can	  attention	  to	  sound	  contribute	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  recent	  developments	  and	  tensions	  
in	  Xinjiang?	  How	  do	  social	  and	  ideological	  transformations	  entwine	  with	  the	  soundscape?	  The	  sonic	  
snapshots	  sketched	  above	  give	  a	  fleeting	  impression	  of	  the	  lived	  experience	  of	  development	  for	  local	  
people	   in	   Xinjiang.	   Its	   noise	   is	   inescapable,	   overwhelming;	   sometimes	   alienating	   and	   fearful,	  
sometimes	  a	  tolerated	  or	  even	  welcomed	  marker	  of	  private	  achievements:	  a	  new	  home	  or	  a	  good	  
cotton	   crop.	   These	   snapshots	   also	  point	   to	   the	   increasing	   segregation	  of	   social	   space	   in	   Xinjiang’s	  
cities.	  The	  heat	  and	  noise	  of	  the	  public	  squares	  mark	  not	  only	  the	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  Han	  Chinese	  
migrants	  but	  also	  their	   increasing	  confidence	  to	  claim	  and	  dominate	  public	  space.	  Many	  Uyghurs	   -­‐	  
parents	  of	  young	  children,	  groups	  of	  teenagers	  and	  young	  couples	  –	  regularly	  visit	  the	  public	  squares	  
and	  enjoy	  the	   leisure	  opportunities	  and	  freedoms	  they	  afford,	  but	  others	  -­‐	   the	  older	  generation	   in	  
particular	   -­‐	  experience	  these	  spaces	  almost	  as	  tourists	   in	  their	  own	  land,	  marvelling	  at	  the	  pace	  of	  
change,	  the	  new	  technologies	  and	  the	  extraordinary,	  alien,	  heat	  and	  noise.	  
In	  this	  article	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  Uyghur	  soundscape,	  privileging	  the	  ethnic	  group	  as	  a	  site	  of	  investigation	  
rather	   than	   the	   geographical	   region	   of	   Xinjiang.	   This	   focus	   might	   at	   first	   glance	   seem	   counter-­‐
intuitive	   if	   we	   easily	   equate	   soundscape	   with	   landscape,	   but	   if	   we	   understand	   soundscape	   as	   a	  
cultural	  production	  then	  in	  this	  ethnically	  divided	  region	  soundscapes	  are	  also	  ethnically	  marked.	  A	  
whole	  range	  of	  sounds	  are	  differently	  perceived	  by	  different	  ethnic	  groups,	  indeed	  many	  sounds	  of	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key	   importance	  to	  one	  group	  may	  be	  barely	  audible	  to	  others.	  Ethnicity	   is,	  of	  course,	  not	  the	  only	  
marker	   of	   identity	   and	   difference	   in	   this	   region,	   but	   it	   is	   salient,	   and	   it	   forms	   the	   basis	   for	   this	  
investigation.	  
	  
The	  new	  Islamic	  soundscape	  of	  Erdaoqiao	  
A	  growing	  body	  of	  work	  applies	  these	  approaches	  to	  Islamic	  societies	  across	  the	  Middle	  East,	  North	  
Africa	   and	   Indonesia,	   and	  develops	   the	  notion	  of	   specifically	   Islamic	   soundscapes:	   ones	  which	   are	  
created,	   experienced	   and	   interpreted	   in	   ways	   particular	   to	   the	  Muslim	   people	   who	   inhabit	   them	  
(Hirschkind	  2006;	  Eisenberg	  2009;	  Rasmussen	  2010).	  Likewise	  in	  Xinjiang	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  listen	  in	  on	  
a	  specifically	  Uyghur	  Islamic	  soundscape:	  one	  inhabited	  and	  interpreted	  by	  Uyghur	  Muslims.	  	  
Between	  the	  years	  of	  2009	  and	  2012,	  a	   remarkable	   transformation	  occurred	   in	   the	  soundscape	  of	  
the	   Uyghur	   area	   of	   Ürümchi,	   the	   regional	   capital	   of	   Xinjiang.	   These	   changes	   were	   not	   obviously	  
modern	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  Han	  Chinese-­‐dominated	  soundscape	  of	  the	  public	  squares,	  but	  they	  clearly	  
indexed	   an	   alternative	   form	   of	  modernity.	   The	   Uyghur	   part	   of	   the	   city	   is	   centred	   on	   the	   area	   of	  
Erdaoqiao	   (Dong	   Kövrük),	   the	   city’s	  main	  mosque	   and	   the	   new	   Big	   Bazaar:	   a	   recent	   tourism	   and	  
shopping	   development	   where	   a	   fake	   minaret	   modelled	   on	   Bukhara	   is	   adorned	   with	   huge	  
advertisements	  for	  Kentucky	  Fried	  Chicken.	  Under	  Qing	  imperial	  rule,	  this	  area	  lay	  south	  of	  the	  city	  
gates	  and	  was	  little	  more	  than	  a	  shantytown	  for	  Uyghur	  traders.	  In	  2009,	  this	  was	  the	  area	  through	  
which	  Uyghur	   students	  marched	   to	   protest	   against	   killings	   of	  Uyghur	  workers	   in	   China’s	   southern	  
factories,	  and	  where	  some	  of	  the	  worst	  interethnic	  violence	  ensued	  after	  armed	  police	  broke	  up	  the	  
demonstration	  (Millward	  2009).	  In	  the	  months	  that	  followed	  the	  violence,	  the	  existing	  segregation	  of	  
the	   city	   grew	  much	   sharper,	   as	   Han	   residents	   moved	   out	   and	   Uyghurs	   from	   the	   Han-­‐dominated	  
northern	  part	  of	  the	  city	  moved	  in.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  striking	  Islamization	  of	  the	  space	  occurred.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Woman	  wearing	  the	  niqab	  in	  Ürümchi.	  Courtesy	  of	  Aziz	  Isa.	  
	   4	  
When	  I	  returned	  to	  the	  region	  after	  a	  break	  of	  three	  years	  in	  summer	  2012,	  the	  changes	  were	  visibly,	  
and	  contentiously,	  marked	  by	  women’s	  choice	  of	  dress.	  Numerous	  young	  women	  could	  be	  seen	  on	  
the	  street	  fully	  covered	  in	  what	  Uyghurs	  call	  the	  ‘Arab	  style’	  of	  dress,	  some	  in	  full	  length	  black	  robes	  
including	   the	   niqab	   facial	   veil,	   others	   following	   alternative	   fashions,	   their	   heads	   swathed	   in	   fake	  
Burberry	  checked	  scarves.	  Such	  clothing	  choices	  were	  not	  unknown	  a	  decade	  ago,	  but	  before	  2009	  
women	  who	   chose	   to	   fully	   veil	   in	   this	  manner	   formed	   a	   tiny	  minority,	   and	   stood	   out	   against	   the	  
traditional	   light	   headscarf	   tied	   over	   the	   hair	   behind	   the	   neck,	   and	   the	   many,	   usually	   educated	  
women	  who	  went	  about	  uncovered.	   In	  another	  new	  development,	  stallholders	  on	  the	  street	  were	  
openly	  selling	  privately	  produced	  Uyghur	  language	  books	  and	  pamphlets	  to	  teach	  the	  basics	  of	  daily	  
prayers	  and	  Qur’anic	  recitation	  (qira’ät),	  alongside	  an	  array	  of	  Islamic	  talismans	  and	  charms;	  prayer	  
beads	  and	  blue	  glass	  discs	  to	  avert	   the	  evil	  eye	   imported	  from	  Turkey.	  Cigarettes	  had	  disappeared	  
from	  the	  shops,	  and	  most	  restaurants	  had	  stopped	  selling	  alcohol,	  where	  before	  Uyghur	  men	  had	  sat	  
openly	  smoking	  and	  drinking	  strong	  Chinese	  liquor.	  ‘They	  take	  up	  space	  for	  too	  long,	  and	  fight,	  and	  it	  
is	  against	  our	  religion’,	  said	  a	  restaurant	  owner.	  There	  were	  rumours	  of	  murders:	  a	  drunken	  man	  had	  
been	  set	  upon	  as	  he	  wandered	  home	  at	  night,	  and	  his	  mutilated	  body	  dumped	  in	  front	  of	  the	  main	  
mosque.	  	  
The	  Islamic	  soundscape	  of	  Erdaoqiao	  in	  2012	  was	  still	  far	  more	  muted	  than	  the	  glorious	  cacophonies	  
of	  Mombasa	  or	  Jakata,	  but	  compared	  to	  my	  previous	  visits	  over	  the	  past	  decade,	  it	  was	  a	  veritable	  
riot	   of	   religious	   sounds.	   Where	   before	   Uyghur	   pop	   songs	   and	   traditional	   dutar	   melodies	   had	  
dominated,	  now	  imported	  DVDs	  of	  nasheed	  religious	  songs,	  many	  sung	  in	  Arabic	  or	  even	  in	  English,	  
could	  be	  heard	  from	  the	  restaurants.	  On	  Friday	  at	  noon	  the	  sound	  of	  the	  sermon	  from	  the	  mosque	  –	  
never	  previously	  audible	  –	  was	  carried	  by	  loudspeakers	  out	  into	  the	  surrounding	  streets.	  The	  garden	  
of	  the	  mosque	  was	  crowded	  with	  men	  praying.	  On	  the	  pavement	  outside	  boys	  sold	  prayer	  mats	  and	  
surreptitiously	   showed	   to	   interested	   customers	   an	   array	   of	   illegal	   religious	   VCDs	   adorned	   with	  
improving	   images	   such	   as	   a	   glass	   of	   beer	   overlying	   the	   flames	   of	   Hell,	   or	   two	   kneeling	   skeletons,	  
their	  bony	  arms	  upraised	  in	  ecstatic	  prayer.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Religious	  VCDs.	  Courtesy	  of	  Aziz	  Isa.	  
	   5	  
	  
Changing	  patterns	  of	  Islamic	  faith:	  a	  soundscapes	  approach	  	  
Recent	  studies	  of	  Muslim	  societies	  have	  paid	  close	  attention	  to	  forms	  of	  negotiation,	  contestation,	  
and	  control	  over	  sacred	  authority	  and	  correct	  practice	   (Soares	  &	  Osella	  2009).	  Many	  authors	  have	  
focused	   on	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   and	   various	   new	   publics,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   effects	   of	  
media	  technologies	  on	  contemporary	  religious	  discourse	  and	  practices	  (Hirschkind	  2006;	  Ho	  2010).	  
Magnus	  Marsden	  proposes	   ‘a	  new	  and	  different	  understanding	  of	   the	   relationship	  between	   Islam,	  
everyday	  religious	  experience	  and	   interpersonal	  relationships	   in	  Muslim	  societies’	  which	  takes	   into	  
consideration	  the	  complexity	  of	  interactions	  between	  local	  systems	  of	  aesthetics	  and	  global	  forms	  of	  
religious	  transformation	  (Marsden	  2005:	  22-­‐23).	  Saba	  Mahmood	  calls	  for	  scholars	  to	  interrogate	  the	  
practical	  and	  conceptual	  conditions	  under	  which	  different	  forms	  of	  desire	  emerge,	  arguing	  that:	  
We	  need	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  local	  explanations	  –	  the	  terms	  that	  people	  use	  to	  organize	  their	  
lives	  are	  not	  simply	  a	  gloss	  for	  universally	  shared	  assumptions	  about	  the	  world	  and	  one’s	  place	  
in	   it,	   but	   are	   actually	   constructive	   of	   different	   forms	   of	   personhood,	   knowledge,	   and	  
experience.	  (Mahmood	  2005:	  16)	  	  
This	   article	   applies	   these	   questions	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Uyghur	   society	   in	   the	   Xinjiang	   Uyghur	  
Autonomous	  Region	  of	   China,	   using	   a	   focus	   on	   sound	   and	   the	   soundscape	   as	   a	  means	   to	   explore	  
them.	  Although	  Islamic	  religious	  practice	  in	  Xinjiang	  remains	  firmly	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Chinese	  
Communist	   Party	   (CCP),	   many	   of	   the	   contemporary	   realities	   faced	   by	  Muslims	   in	   this	   region	   are	  
similar,	  indeed	  directly	  related	  to	  those	  confronting	  Muslims	  in	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union	  (Hann	  2006),	  
in	   particular	   increasing	   exposure	   to	   transnational	   currents	   of	   Islamic	   ideology,	   and	   increased	  
pressure	   from	  the	  state	  which	  conflates	   religiosity	  with	  anti-­‐state	  activity	  and	  extremist	   terrorism.	  
This	  article	  pursues	  a	  set	  of	  related	  questions:	  How	  does	  the	  Uyghur	  religious	  soundscape	  reflect	  the	  
rise	   of	   new	   forms	   of	   Islam?	   What	   do	   these	   new	   religious	   modalities	   sound	   like,	   and	   more	  
importantly,	   how	   do	   people	   listen	   to	   them?	   Thus	   I	   am	   interested	   in	   not	   only	   how	   these	   sounds	  
reflect	   new	   realities,	   but	   also	   how	   they	   help	   to	   construct	   new	   ways	   of	   being	   Muslim	   and	   being	  
Uyghur	  in	  Xinjiang.	  
The	  Xinjiang	  media	  has	   frequently	  highlighted	  state	  concerns	  about	   the	   influence	  of	   Islamic	  media	  
imported	  from	  outside	  in	  Xinjiang.	  Such	  media	  items	  are	  typically	  portrayed	  as	  dangerous	  polluting	  
influences,	   ones	   that	   purvey	   religious	   extremism,	   damage	   inter-­‐ethnic	   harmony,	   and	   promote	  
terrorism.	   In	   this	  article	   I	   follow	  state	  concerns	  by	   taking	  a	  closer	   look	  at	   the	  circulation	  of	   Islamic	  
media	  in	  Xinjiang,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  ways	  that	  their	  sounds	  are	  absorbed,	  understood,	  and	  
reproduced	   within	   Uyghur	   society.	   I	   am	   particularly	   interested	   in	   two	   types	   of	   sounds	   that	   are	  
prevalent	  in	  these	  forms	  of	  media:	  horror	  film	  sound	  effects	  and	  Qur’anic	  recitation.	  The	  circulation	  
of	  these	  sounds	  provides	  insights	  into	  the	  global-­‐local	  dynamics	  of	  Islamic	  ideologies	  and	  practices,	  
their	  changing	  meanings	  as	  they	  enter	  new	  contexts,	  their	  affective	  impact,	  and	  power	  to	  persuade	  
and	  transform.	  
New	  forms	  of	  Islam	  arise	  and	  develop	  among	  different	  sectors	  of	  Uyghur	  society	  in	  different	  ways.	  In	  
this	   article	   I	   focus	   primarily	   on	   the	   religious	   experience	   and	   practice	   of	   rural	   Uyghur	   women	   -­‐	  
farmers	   and	   small	   traders	   -­‐	   in	   the	   Aqsu	   region	   of	   southern	   Xinjiang,	   where	   I	   have	   conducted	  
fieldwork	  over	  several	  years.1	  The	  religious	  practice	  of	   these	  women	   is	  of	  particular	   interest	   in	   the	  
project	  of	  listening	  beyond	  text,	  following	  the	  suggestion	  by	  David	  Panagia	  that	  an	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  
discourse	   creates	   a	   de	   facto	   partition	   between	   those	   who	   can	   and	   cannot	   speak,	   between	  
appropriate	   and	   inappropriate	   sounds.	   Panagia	   propose	   an	   account	   of	   the	   utterance	   attentive	   to	  
those	  qualities	  that	  extend	  beyond	  its	  semantic	  texture	  and	  grammatical	  boundaries	  (Panagia	  2009:	  
47-­‐8).	   Rural	  Uyghur	  women	   represent	   one	   of	   the	  most	  marginalized	   sectors	   of	  Uyghur,	   distanced	  
from	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  religious	  and	  political	  institutions,	  least	  able	  to	  speak	  within	  the	  parameters	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of	   mainstream	   discourse.	   The	   ways	   in	   which	   they	   do	   speak	   are	   easily	   dismissed	   by	   educated,	  
rationalist	  Uyghurs	  as	  ignorant,	  superstitious,	  and	  backward.	  They	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  portrayed	  in	  
the	  Xinjiang	  media	  and	  in	  Uyghur	  popular	  culture	  as	  idealized	  repositories	  of	  tradition,	  and	  passive	  
nostalgic	   symbols.	   In	   fact,	   many	   of	   these	   women	   are	   highly	   networked	   individuals	   who	   exercise	  
considerable	  social	  and	  political	  agency.	  Kandiyoti	  and	  Azimova	  suggest	  that	  Central	  Asian	  women’s	  
ritual	  activities	  are	  strongly	  responsive	  to	  social	  change	  since	  participants	  experience	  the	  economic,	  
social,	   and	   religious	   components	  of	   ritual	  and	  associational	   life	  as	  a	   seamless	   totality	   (Kandiyoti	  &	  
Azimova	  2004:	  336).	  As	  I	  will	  argue,	  their	  religious	  utterances	  are	  in	  no	  sense	  remnants	  of	  the	  past	  
but	   are	   rather	   in	   active	   dialogue	   with	   global	   flows	   of	   Islamic	   ideologies,	   and	   current	   social	   and	  
ideological	  change	  within	  Xinjiang.	  	  
	  
A	  brief	  history	  of	  Islam	  in	  the	  Xinjiang	  Uyghur	  Autonomous	  Region	  of	  China	  
During	   the	   first	   few	  years	  of	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	   (CCP)	   rule	   in	  Xinjiang,	   the	  Party	   adopted	  a	  
relatively	   cautious	   and	   tolerant	   approach	   towards	   Islam.	   Shariah	   courts	   and	   the	   office	   of	   qazi	  
(religious	  judge)	  were	  abolished	  in	  1950,	  but	  the	  rights	  of	  Muslims	  to	  mosque	  land	  were	  protected.	  
The	   Islamic	  Association	  of	  China	  was	   formed	   in	  1953	  to	  manage	  the	  training	  and	  oversee	  officially	  
sanctioned	  religious	  clerics.	  During	  the	  Cultural	  Revolution	  period,	  Islam	  was	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
‘four	   olds’:	   customs,	   cultures,	   habits,	   and	   ideas	   fostered	   by	   the	   exploiting	   classes	   to	   poison	   the	  
minds	  of	   the	  people.	  The	  period	  saw	  humiliation	  of	   religious	  practitioners	  and	  burning	  of	  Qur’ans,	  
but	  continued	  covert	  practice	  and	  transmission,	  and	  increased	  domestication	  of	  religion,	  as	  in	  Soviet	  
Central	  Asia	  under	  Soviet	  rule,	  with	  the	  household	  becoming	  the	  primary	  locus	  for	  religious	  activities	  
(Waite	  forthcoming).	  	  
The	  Islamic	  Association	  of	  China	  was	  reconvened	  in	  1980	  after	  a	  break	  of	  17	  years.	  Today,	  the	  main	  
officially	   sanctioned	  college	   for	   training	   religious	  professionals	   in	  Xinjiang	   is	   the	   Islamic	   Institute	   in	  
Ürümchi.	   Its	   curriculum,	   which	   includes	   study	   of	   the	   Qur’an,	   Hadith,	   Law,	   Arab	   language,	   and	  
Communist	  Party	   ideology,	   is	  governed	  by	   the	   Islamic	  Association	  of	  China,	  and	  only	   its	  graduates	  
can	  serve	  as	  official	  imam	  in	  the	  region’s	  mosques	  (Fuller	  &	  Lipman	  2004).	  The	  subjugation	  of	  official	  
clerics	   to	   the	   state	  has	   implications	   for	   the	   religious	   legitimacy	  of	   these	   leaders.	   There	  have	  been	  
several	  high	  profile	  attempted	  and	  successful	  murders	  of	  prominent	  imam	  in	  southern	  Xinjiang	  since	  
the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  Yet	  most	  imam	  command	  the	  respect	  of	  the	  community,	  and	  successfully	  negotiate	  
the	  twin	  roles	  of	  providing	  religious	  guidance	  and	  complying	  with	  government	  directives.	  Officially	  
endorsed	   religious	   literature	   is	   available	   in	   state	  bookshops,	   and	   the	   Islamic	  Association	  organizes	  
the	  pilgrimage	  to	  Mecca	  (hajj)	  every	  year	  for	  a	  select	  group	  of	  well-­‐connected	  pilgrims.	  
However,	   in	  many	  ways	   state	  policies	   are	  directly	   hostile	   to	   religious	  practice	   and	   transmission	   in	  
this	   region.	  State	  employees	  and	  students	  must	  not	  be	  seen	   to	   follow	  any	   religion,	  and	  numerous	  
ordinary	   aspects	   of	  Muslim	   observance,	   such	   as	   abstinence	   from	   pork,	   daily	   prayers	   and	   fasting,	  
veiling	  or	  growing	  beards,	  are	  periodically	  criticized	  as	  antisocial	  or	  illegal.	  Since	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  first	  
‘strike	   hard’	   (yanda)	   campaign	   in	   1996,	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   religious	   practices	   which	   lie	   outside	   the	  
sphere	   of	   the	   officially	   controlled	   mosques	   -­‐	   including	   shrine	   pilgrimage,	   religious	   instruction	   of	  
children,	   and	  home-­‐based	  healing	   rituals	   -­‐	   have	  been	  designated	   	   ‘illegal	   religious	   activities’	   (feifa	  
zongjiao	   huodong).	   These	   are	   frequently	   linked	   to	   ‘separatism’	   (fenlie	   zhuyi,	   i.e.	   ethnic	   nationalist	  
projects	   to	   ‘split	   the	   motherland’)	   and	   with	   ‘terrorism’	   (kongbu	   zhuyi)	   in	   official	   discourse,	   and	  
practitioners	   may	   be	   subject	   to	   fines,	   imprisonment,	   and	   in	   extreme	   cases	   the	   death	   penalty	  
(Becquelin	  2004;	  Harris	  2013;	  Uyghur	  Human	  Rights	  Project	  2013).	  	  
In	  spite	  of,	  or	  perhaps	  in	  part	  because	  of	  these	  fierce	  restrictions,	  Islamic	  reformist	  ideas	  have	  been	  
disseminated	  within	   Uyghur	   society	   since	   at	   least	   the	   late	   1980s,	   and	   since	   2009	   appear	   to	   have	  
achieved	  a	  tipping	  point.	  These	  new	  ideologies	  are	  transmitted	  not	  only	  via	  the	  Internet	  but	  also	  by	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various	  actors	  within	  transnational	  Islamic	  ﬁelds,	  including	  Uyghur	  intellectuals,	  merchants,	  wealthy	  
Uyghurs	   returning	   from	   the	   hajj,	   and	   young	   men	   receiving	   a	   religious	   education	   abroad.2	  Paula	  
Schrode	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  these	  trends	  represent	  a	  new	  fusion	  of	  social	  prestige,	  economic	  power,	  
staged	   piety	   and	   Islamic	   knowledge.	   Wealthy	   local	   merchants	   acquire	   social	   prestige	   by	  
accomplishing	   the	  hajj	  and	  sponsoring	   the	  new	  mosques	   that	  are	  now	  a	  prominent	   feature	  of	   the	  
landscape.	  The	  hajj	   also	   represents	  an	  opportunity	   to	  acquire	  new,	   first-­‐hand	  knowledge	  of	   Islam,	  
and	  to	  compare	  local	  Islam	  with	  the	  kinds	  promoted	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  elsewhere.	  In	  this	  context,	  
Uyghur	   Muslims	   who	   demand	   the	   ‘purification’	   of	   traditional	   Uyghur	   Islam	   from	   corruption	   and	  
superstition	  (khurapatliq)	  are	  viewed	  as	  religiously	  cosmopolitan	  and	  knowledgeable,	  and	  they	  gain	  
social	  prestige	  from	  their	  reformist	  stance.	  
While	   Schrode	   views	   the	   rise	   of	   these	   new	  ways	   of	   being	  Muslim	   primarily	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	  
mobility	  and	  greater	  access	  to	  global	  Islamic	  debates,	  Joanne	  Smith-­‐Finley	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  
new	  forms	  of	  Islam	  amongst	  the	  Uyghur	  should	  be	  read	  primarily	  as	  a	  strategy	  of	  resistance	  to	  the	  
state,	   in	   particular	   a	   strategy	   for	   buttressing	   Uyghur	   ethnic	   identity	   in	   response	   to	   increasingly	  
assimilationist	   policies.	   Smith-­‐Finley	   contends	   that	   the	   Islamic	   renewal	   is	   driven	   by	   the	   failure	   of	  
state	  development	  policies	  to	  provide	  equitable	  opportunities	  for	  Uyghurs,	  and	  that	  economic	  and	  
cultural	  marginalization	  are	  the	  principal	  drivers	  that	  have	  led	  many	  Uyghurs	  to	  seek	  out	  the	  forms	  
of	   personal	   transformation	   that	   are	   afforded	   by	   religious	   piety	   (Smith	   Finley	   2013:	   287-­‐9).	  While	  
reformist	   Uyghur	  Muslims	   often	   refer	   to	   themselves	   as	   sünnätchi	   (followers	   of	   the	   Sunnah3)	   the	  
state’s	  fears	  of	  religious	  extremism	  are	  explicitly	  directed	  at	  ‘Wahhabism’.4	  Official	   imams	  regularly	  
preach	  against	  Wahhabis	  in	  the	  region’s	  mosques,	  and	  all	  sorts	  of	  violent	  incidents	  in	  the	  region	  are	  
routinely	   attributed	   to	   Wahhabis	   in	   the	   Chinese	   media.	   Dru	   Gladney	   has	   argued	   that	   the	   term	  
‘Wahhabi’	   in	   Xinjiang	   is	   ‘a	   euphemism	   in	   the	   region	   for	   strict	   Muslims	   not	   an	   organized	   Islamic	  
school’	  (Gladney	  2004:	  257).	  	  
Several	   encounters	   during	  my	   own	   fieldwork	   in	   2012	   serve	   to	   illustrate	   the	   complexities	   of	   these	  
new	   religious	   identities.	  We	   attended	   a	  näzir5	  (death	   ritual)	   held	   by	   a	   pious	   family	   from	   southern	  
Xinjiang	   who	   had	   set	   up	   a	   successful	   IT	   business	   in	   Ürümchi.	   An	   elderly	   official	   imam	   from	   their	  
hometown	   also	   attended.	   During	   the	   meal,	   the	   brothers	   of	   the	   family	   criticized	   the	   imam	  
aggressively:	  ‘Why	  do	  you	  preach	  about	  unity	  of	  the	  nationalities	  in	  your	  mosque?	  Why	  do	  you	  allow	  
the	  Chinese	  flag	  to	  hang	  on	  your	  mosque?	  Why	  don’t	  you	  preach	  about	  how	  to	  be	  a	  good	  Muslim?	  
Tell	  them:	  don’t	  drink,	  don’t	  smoke,	  work	  hard.	  We	  will	  all	  die.	  You	  should	  preach	  true	  Islam	  before	  
you	  die’.	  They	  also	  clashed	  over	  the	  details	  of	  ritual	  procedure.	  When	  the	  imam	  tried	  to	  pray	  for	  the	  
soul	  of	  their	  father	  who	  died	  several	  years	  previously,	  they	  stopped	  him	  short.	  ‘Let	  our	  father	  rest	  in	  
peace;	  why	  do	  you	  pray	  for	  him	  now	  when	  he	  has	  been	  dead	  for	  years?’	  The	  imam	  was	  very	  upset	  
and	  afterwards	  privately	  accused	  them	  of	  being	  Wahhabis,	  yet	  the	  practice	  of	  näzir	   is	   itself	  heavily	  
criticized	  by	  reformists	  in	  Xinjiang.	  
A	   government	   worker	   complained	   to	   us	   (unofficially)	   that	   religion	   had	   overtaken	   nationality	   as	   a	  
marker	  of	   identity:	   ‘The	  other	  day	  a	   family	  came	  to	  ask	  me	  for	  help,	  and	  they	  said,	  please	  help	  us	  
because	  we	  are	  all	  Muslims.	   I	  asked,	  why	  don’t	  you	  say,	  because	  we	  are	  all	  Uyghurs?’	  There	   is	  no	  
such	  thing	  as	  Wahhabism,	  he	  told	  us.	  Uyghur	  girls	  are	  adopting	  the	  ‘Arab	  style’	  of	  full-­‐face	  veiling	  not	  
because	  of	  any	  serious	  religious	  belief	  but	  because	   it	  annoys	   the	  Chinese.	  But	  his	  wife	  was	   fasting	  
during	  Ramadan;	  possible	  for	  her	  even	  though	  she	  was	  a	  teacher	   in	  a	  state	  school	  because	   in	  that	  
year	  it	  fell	  in	  the	  school	  holidays.	  His	  son	  was	  drinking	  heavily	  a	  few	  years	  ago,	  but	  had	  lately	  started	  
to	   perform	   his	   daily	   prayers	   (bäsh	   namaz).	   A	   Uyghur	   colleague	   based	   at	   a	   Xinjiang	   university	  
commented	  that	  there	  were	  many	  new	  views	  of	   Islam	  current	   in	  Ürümchi,	  which	   in	  her	  view	  were	  
largely	  spread	  by	  the	  internet:	  ‘If	  you	  sit	  five	  people	  down	  and	  ask	  them	  about	  Islam	  they	  will	  argue	  
about	  five	  different	  interpretations’.	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Islamic	  media	  in	  Xinjiang	  
Questions	   concerning	   the	   use	   of	   the	   Internet	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   digital	   media	   as	   vehicles	   for	  
religious	   and	   political	   mobilization	   have	   been	   widely	   addressed	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   Islam	   in	   the	  
Middle	  East	  and	  elsewhere	   (Gladney	  2004;	  Hirschkind	  2012;	  Ho	  2010).	  Much	  of	   this	   literature	  has	  
focused	  on	  the	  political	  geography	  of	  Islamic	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  as	  it	  is	  refashioned	  
in	  the	  context	  of	  new	  technologies	  of	  mediation,	  and	  how	  it	  is	  weakening	  the	  norms	  and	  institutions	  
of	   traditional	   religious	  authority.	  Dale	  Eickelman	  and	  James	  Piscatori	   (2004)	  have	  argued	  that	  with	  
the	   spread	  of	   new	  media	   technologies	   there	  has	  been	   an	   increased	   fragmentation	  of	   authority	   in	  
Muslim	   societies,	   a	   greater	   diversity	   of	   people	   speaking	   about	  what	   Islam	   is,	   and	   the	   ‘traditional’	  
interpreters	   of	   Islam	  have	   lost	   their	  monopoly.	   As	  we	  have	   seen,	   the	   Chinese	   state,	  which	  wields	  
considerable	  control	  over	  the	  ‘traditional	  interpreters’	  of	  Islam	  in	  China,	  is	  particularly	  concerned	  to	  
control	   the	  spread	  of	  new	  religious	   ideologies	  carried	  by	  digital	  media,	  yet	   the	  periodic	  campaigns	  
and	  crackdowns	  appear	  to	  have	  done	  little	  to	  stem	  the	  flow.	  We	  know	  from	  the	  spate	  of	  attacks	  on	  
official	  imam,	  and	  the	  debates	  such	  as	  the	  one	  described	  above	  over	  the	  practice	  of	  näzir,	  that	  the	  
authority	   of	   Xinjiang’s	   official	   imams	   is	   today	  being	   challenged	   in	  multiple	   contexts,	   sometimes	   in	  
ways	   that	   are	   discursive	   and	   sometimes	   in	  ways	   that	   involve	   physical	   violence.	  However,	   there	   is	  
little	   available	   information	   about	   the	   kinds	   of	   Islamic	   media	   that	   are	   currently	   circulating	   within	  
Xinjiang.	  What	  kinds	  of	  sounds	  and	  ideologies	  are	  carried	  by	  these	  ‘illegal’	  religious	  media,	  and	  how	  
are	  Uyghur	  Muslims	  absorbing	  and	  reinterpreting	  them?	  
Beginning	   in	   the	  1980s,	  China	  opened	  up	   its	  borders	  after	   several	  decades	  of	   relative	   isolation.	   In	  
Xinjiang,	   a	   lively	   Uyghur	   cassette	   industry	   swiftly	   developed,	   with	   Uyghur	   pop	   and	   traditional	  
productions	   released	  by	   Chinese	   recording	   companies	   on	   sale	   alongside	   bootlegs	   of	  western	   pop,	  
rock	  and	  light	  music,	  and	  Hindi	  film	  songs	  (Harris	  2002).	  Religious	  media	  also	  filtered	  into	  the	  region,	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  cassettes	  brought	  back	  from	  the	  hajj,	  and	  traded	  across	  the	  border	  from	  Pakistan	  and	  
neighbouring	   Central	   Asian	   states.	   By	   the	  mid-­‐1990s,	   the	   cassettes	   had	   largely	   been	   replaced	   by	  
VCDs	  –	  a	   form	  of	  cheap	  digital	  video	  technology	   that	   is	   still	  widespread	   in	  China	   today.	  Under	   the	  
periodic	  ‘strike	  hard’	  or	  anti-­‐religious	  extremism	  campaigns	  that	  began	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  sale	  of	  
Qur’anic	  recitation	  recordings	  and	  other	  religious	  media	  were	  prohibited,	  but	  the	  bans	  were	  uneven,	  
and	  the	  black	  market	  has	  continued	  to	  flourish.	  As	  access	  to	  the	  Internet	  became	  more	  widespread	  
in	   Xinjiang	   during	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   21st	   century,	   largely	   through	   the	   Internet	   cafes	   based	   in	  
towns	   and	   cities	   across	   the	   region,	   new	   forms	   of	   access	   to	   global	   Islamic	   forms	   became	  possible,	  
although	   heavily	   filtered	   by	   state	   control	   systems.	   In	   more	   recent	   years	   the	   explosion	   in	   smart	  
phones	  and	  various	  forms	  of	  social	  media	  has	  enabled	  much	  more	  widespread	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  sharing	  
of	  Islamic	  media.	  Many	  of	  the	  Islamic	  media	  items	  that	  circulate	  within	  Uyghur	  society	  can	  be	  found	  
in	  multiple	  formats,	  and	  they	  flow	  freely	  between	  all	  these	  different	  media	  platforms.	  	  
During	  fieldwork	   in	  southern	  Xinjiang	   in	  2012,	   I	  surveyed	  a	  selection	  of	  explicitly	   Islamic	  VCDs	  that	  
were	  offered	  for	  sale	  on	  the	  black	  market	  and	  were	  enthusiastically	  consumed	  by	  rural	  women.	  They	  
kept	  them	  hidden	  out	  of	  sight	  for	  fear	  of	  police	  raids	  on	  their	  homes,	  and	  told	  me	  that	  possession	  
would	   earn	   them	   a	   short	   prison	   sentence.	   The	   media	   that	   they	   contained	   was	   diverse.	   Some	  
appeared	  to	  be	  the	  products	  of	  backroom	  commerce	  by	  opportunistic	  small	  businessmen	  who	  had	  
downloaded	   a	   seemingly	   random	   selection	   of	   Islamic	   music	   videos	   freely	   available	   on	   Chinese	  
websites,	  and	  compiled	  and	  produced	  them	  as	  VCDs	  to	  sell	  to	  pious	  villagers	  in	  search	  of	  knowledge	  
about	   their	   faith.	   Such	  VCDs	   could	   command	   a	   premium	  price	   because	   of	   the	   lure	   of	   the	   illicit;	   a	  
phenomenon	   I	   have	   previously	   noted	   in	   relation	   to	   Uyghur	   nationalist	   music	   productions	   (Harris	  
2002:	  279-­‐80).	  They	  included	  large	  numbers	  of	  Arabic,	  Turkish	  and	  Malaysian	  soft	  pop	  style	  nasheed	  
or	   illahi	   religious	  songs,	  predominantly	  with	  synthesized	   instrumental	  accompaniment	  and	  endless	  
shots	  of	  waterfalls	  and	  flowers,	  all	  evidently	  downloaded	  from	  the	  mainstream	  Chinese	  equivalents	  
of	   YouTube:	   Youku,	   Tudou	   or	   56.com.	   International	   star	   singers	   featured	   strongly,	   such	   as	   the	  
Turkish	   cosmopolitan	   modernist	   Sami	   Yusuf;	   several	   Malaysian	   Brothers	   groups	   (the	   Islamic	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equivalent	   of	   the	   UK	   Boy	   Bands),	   and	   the	   long-­‐standing	   Uzbek	   pop	   diva	   Yultuz	   Osmanova	   in	   her	  
religious	  phase	  with	  a	  remarkable	  New	  Romantic	  take	  on	  pious	  performance.	  There	  were	  also	  Arab	  
language	   children’s	   cartoons	   dubbed	   into	   Uyghur	   featuring	   plasticine	   camels	   explaining	   the	  
meanings	  of	  the	  Festival	  of	  Sacrifice	  (Eid,	  or	  Qurban	   in	  Uyghur);	  an	  extremely	  poor	  quality	  copy	  of	  
the	  1977	  Hollywood	   film	  of	   the	   life	   of	  Mohammed,	   ‘The	  Message’	   directed	  by	  Moustapha	  Akkad,	  
and	  a	  Xinjiang	  government	   information	  video	   for	  pilgrims	  about	   to	  embark	  on	   the	  hajj:	  hardly	   the	  
stuff	  of	  extremism.	  
Other	  productions	  were	  equally	  diverse	   in	  origin,	  but	  seemed	  to	  be	  more	  consistent	  exercises	   in	  a	  
form	  of	  religious	  ideology	  which	  drew	  on	  eschatological	  themes	  of	  suffering,	  death,	  judgement	  and	  
fear	  of	  God	   in	  order	   in	   to	  promote	   the	  virtues	  of	   a	  pious	   lifestyle.	  One	  VCD	   titled	   ‘Olum’	   (Death),	  
whose	   cover	   depicted	   two	   kneeling	   skeletons,	   included	   a	   rather	   well-­‐produced	   video	   apparently	  
originating	   from	  Jordan	  which	   featured	  the	  death	  of	  a	  sinful	  young	  man	  at	   the	  hands	  of	   the	  angel	  
Azra’il,	   portrayed	  by	  an	  actor	   in	  black	   robes	  holding	   scythe	  and	   chains.	   Like	  many	  other	   videos,	   it	  
drew	  on	  classic	  tropes	  of	  horror	   film:	  the	  camera	   in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  approaching	  menace;	  the	  tight	  
close-­‐up	  on	  the	  terrified	  victim’s	  face.	  Once	  the	  young	  sinner	  is	  despatched,	  the	  viewer	  watches	  with	  
morbid	   fascination	   through	  the	  eyes	  of	  his	  ghost	   the	  ritual	  preparation	  and	  burial	  of	  his	  body,	   the	  
grief	  of	  his	  relatives,	  and	  his	  final	  descent	  into	  the	  flames	  of	  hell.	  This	  sat	  alongside	  a	  video	  produced	  
by	  the	  controversial	  Turkish	  author	  and	  creationist	  Harun	  Yahya	  which	  juxtaposed	  shots	  of	  the	  solar	  
system	  with	  speeded	  up	  simulations	  of	  the	  human	  aging	  process.	  Other	  videos	  were	  notable	  for	  the	  
way	   they	  evidenced	  processes	  of	   transnational	   remediation,	   remixing	  and	  overdubbing.	  Several	  of	  
these	   included	   footage	   -­‐	   apparently	  of	   Saudi	  origin	   -­‐	  of	  hospital	  deathbeds	  and	  gruesome	  corpses	  
overlaid	   by	   Qur’anic	   recitation	   and	   earnest	   sermons	   delivered	   in	   both	   the	   Uzbek	   and	   Uyghur	  
languages.	  In	  his	  study	  of	  cassette	  sermons	  in	  Cairo,	  Hirschkind	  also	  comments	  on	  the	  use	  of	  audio	  
and	  visual	  tropes	  drawn	  directly	  from	  the	  language	  of	  horror	  films,	  asking	  if	  we	  should	  feel	  surprise	  
at	  this	   juxtaposition	  of	  the	  affective	  language	  of	  Hollywood	  and	  that	  of	  the	  holy	  Qur’an.	  He	  argues	  
that	  one	  of	  the	  primary	  tasks	  of	  the	  sermon	  is	  to	  dwell	  on	  death,	  rooting	  it	  in	  the	  sensory	  experience	  
of	   the	  pious	   listener,	   for	   fear	  of	   the	   fires	  of	  hell	   is	  a	   religious	  virtue.	  But	  cassette	  sermons	  are	  not	  
only	  religious	  but	  also	  commercial	  entities,	  rooted	  in	  popular	  culture,	  and	  they	  employ	  the	  seductive	  
and	  marketable	  images	  of	  horror	  film,	  because	  death	  sells	  (Hirschkind	  2006:	  312-­‐316).	  
This	   random	   collection	   of	   religious	   media	   popular	   with	   Uyghur	   village	   women	   in	   2012	   seems	   to	  
exemplify	  the	  processes	  of	  decontextualization	  and	  abstraction	  often	  remarked	  upon	  in	  discussions	  
of	   digitally	  mediated	  productions,	   juxtaposing	   as	   it	   does	   a	  wide	   range	  of	   different	   ideological	   and	  
affective	   relationships	   with	   Islam.	   It	   also	   suggests	   that,	   while	   some	   productions	   may	   seek	   to	  
promote	  particular	   forms	  of	   Islam,	  Uyghurs	  who	  consume	  them	  are	  not	  using	   religious	  media	   in	  a	  
dogmatic	  way	  to	  pursue	  specific	  ideologies.	  It	  would	  seem	  more	  appropriate	  to	  argue	  that	  what	  they	  
seek	   are	   particular	   affective	   religious	   experiences,	   and	   the	   affective	   language	   of	   horror,	   used	   to	  
promote	  pious	  virtues,	  is	  prominent.	  In	  order	  to	  further	  explore	  how	  these	  media	  items	  work	  within	  
Uyghur	  society,	  I	  turn	  to	  one	  case	  study:	  the	  notorious	  video	  of	  the	  snake-­‐monkey-­‐woman.	  
	  
The	  Snake-­‐Monkey-­‐Woman	  
In	   summer	  2012	  a	  video	  was	  circulating	  amongst	  Uyghurs	   in	  China’s	  Xinjiang	  Uyghur	  Autonomous	  
Region.	  Villagers	  flocked	  to	  Internet	  cafes	  to	  watch	  it	  online	  and	  they	  shared	  it	  on	  their	  smart	  phones.	  
The	  video	  depicted	  what	  appeared	  to	  be	  the	  taxidermized	  remains	  of	  a	  snake,	  attached	  to	  the	  upper	  
body	  and	  head	  of	  a	  monkey,	  wearing	  a	  wig	  of	  long,	  blonde	  hair.	  This	  object	  of	  horror	  was	  displayed	  
on	  a	  table	   inside	  a	  home.	  The	  camera	  circled	   it	  while	  hands	  touched	   it	   (no	  faces	  were	  visible)	  and	  
stroked	  its	  hair.	  The	  affective	  impact	  of	  the	  video	  was	  underlined	  by	  a	  spooky	  soundtrack	  of	  screams	  
and	  pulsing	   synthesized	  beats.	  With	   its	   digitally	  manipulated,	   looped	  animal	   cries,	   this	   soundtrack	  
employed	  familiar	  techniques	  of	  sound	  in	  horror	  films:	  using	  extremely	  high	  frequencies	  to	  connote	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an	   unknown	   threat,	   distorting	   familiar	   sounds	   to	   create	   a	   sense	   of	   unease.	   The	   extremely	   poor	  
quality	  of	  the	  production	  only	  added	  to	   its	  aura	  of	  authenticity	  and	  power	  to	  terrify	  (what	  readers	  
might	   know	   as	   the	   Blair	  Witch	   effect).	   It	  was	   particularly	   effective	  when	   viewed	  on	   smart	   phone.	  
Girls	  and	  women	  in	  the	  village	  where	  we	  were	  staying	  were	  frightened.	  We	  first	  became	  aware	  of	  it	  
when	  the	  nine	  year-­‐old	  daughter	  of	  our	  host	  family	  began	  screaming	  hysterically	  one	  night,	  refusing	  
to	  go	  to	  the	  toilet	  (which	  lay	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  garden)	  in	  case	  the	  ‘snake	  woman’	  fell	  on	  her	  from	  the	  
tree	   branches.	  Her	  mother	   asked	  me	   if	   such	  monsters	   really	   exist.	   The	  meaning	  of	   the	   video	  was	  
variously	  interpreted	  by	  people	  we	  knew	  in	  the	  locality,	  but	  the	  dominant	  story	  emerged	  thus:	  	  
These	  were	  the	  remains	  of	  Maynur	  Hajim,	  a	  rich	  businesswoman	  from	  Ürümchi	  who	  was	  known	  to	  
be	  fond	  of	  parties	  and	  dancing.	  (A	  somewhat	  insalubrious	  video	  of	  one	  of	  her	  parties	  had	  circulated	  
online	   a	   year	   earlier	   and	   provoked	   copious	   disapproval).	   Her	   husband	   sent	   her	   on	   the	  hajj	   three	  
times	  but	  she	  wouldn’t	  give	  up	  her	  bad	  habits.	  One	  night	  she	  came	  home	  late.	  Her	  husband	  asked,	  
‘What	  have	  you	  been	  doing?’	  She	  said,	  ‘I	  have	  been	  dancing	  like	  a	  snake	  and	  jumping	  like	  a	  monkey’.	  	  
The	  next	  morning	  he	  woke	  up	  to	  find	  his	  wife	  had	  been	  transformed	  into	  a	  snake-­‐monkey-­‐woman.	  
He	  had	  a	  heart	  attack	  and	  died.	  They	  took	  the	  thing	  to	  the	  main	  mosque	  in	  Ürümchi,	  and	  it	  stayed	  
there	  for	  several	  days	  until	  the	  government	  came	  and	  killed	  it	  by	  lethal	  injection.	  
My	  own	  response	  to	  this	  video	  and	  its	  surrounding	  stories	  was	  to	  assume	  that	  its	  appearance	  in	  rural	  
Uyghur	  society	  represented	  an	  unpleasant	  attempt	  by	  some	  religious	  reformists	  to	  inculcate	  ethical	  
behaviour	  in	  viewers	  through	  fear,	  and	  especially	  to	  discipline	  women	  by	  threatening	  the	  dangers	  of	  
‘un-­‐Islamic’	  bodily	  practices	  such	  as	  dancing.	  However,	  the	  layers	  of	  meaning	  which	  quickly	  accrued	  
around	  it	  were	  quite	  different.	  Even	  before	  the	  video	  made	  a	  stir	   in	  our	  village,	  Uyghur	  netizens	  in	  
Ürümchi	  were	  already	  posting	  online	  articles	  denouncing	  the	  snake	  woman	  as	  a	  ‘fake	  miracle’.	  Some	  
net-­‐savvy	   individuals	   soon	   discovered	   that	   the	   video	   had	   originated	   in	  Malaysia	   in	   2010	  where	   a	  
‘snake	  with	  a	  human	  head’	  had	  been	  displayed	  for	  money	  as	  a	  form	  of	  freak	  show,	  not	  in	  any	  way	  
linked	  to	  religious	  ideologies.6	  It	  had	  subsequently	  circulated	  Chinese	  online	  forums,	  and	  even	  been	  
the	   subject	   of	   a	   TV	   documentary.	   Posts	   on	   Uyghur	   websites	   condemned	   the	   ‘evil	   heart’	   of	   the	  
person	  who	  had	  manipulated	  this	  video,	  added	  the	  ‘horror’	  soundtrack,	  and	  reposted	  it	  on	  Uyghur	  
sites	  with	  intent	  to	  ‘shame	  Islam’.	  They	  also	  lamented	  the	  naivety	  of	  the	  Uyghurs	  who	  believed	  it:	  
We	  know	  that	  Allah	  performed	  many	  miracles	  (möjuz),	  but	  the	  ones	  that	  we	  find	  online	  today	  
-­‐	   the	   gigantic	  man,	   the	   girl	  who	   changed	   into	   a	  monkey,	   the	  pig	  woman	   -­‐	   are	   they	   actually	  
created	  by	  Allah?	  …	   Some	  people	   even	   sell	   these	   videos	  on	   the	  black	  market.	   These	   videos	  
have	  such	  a	  good	  market	  that	  the	  fraudsters	  can’t	  keep	  up	  with	  demand,	  but	  such	  money	  is	  
haram	   (ritually	   impure).	  Our	   [Uyghurs’]	  understanding	  of	  new	  technology	   is	  very	   low,	  so	  we	  
are	  easily	  cheated.7	  
By	  mid-­‐August	   the	   regional	   government	  was	   sufficiently	  alarmed	   to	   issue	  a	  news	   item,	  which	  was	  
aired	   on	   local	   TV	   stations,	   saying	   that	   the	   story	   of	   the	   snake-­‐monkey	  woman	  was	   fake,	   and	  was	  
produced	  by	  the	  dissident	  exile	  organisation,	  the	  World	  Uyghur	  Congress	  in	  order	  to	  incite	  religious	  
extremism	  and	   separatism.8	  Uyghur	  netizens,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  hinted	  darkly	   that	   the	  video	  was	  
actually	  produced	  by	  Chinese	  government	  agents	  who	  wanted	  to	  promote	  superstition	  amongst	  the	  
Uyghurs	  in	  order	  to	  better	  control	  them.	  
These	   layers	  of	   interpretation	   that	  built	  up	  around	   the	  video	  provide	  only	  partial	   glimpses	   into	   its	  
meanings.	  They	  serve	  primarily	  to	  reiterate	  existing	  stereotypes	  and	  entrenched	  attitudes.	  We	  need	  
to	   listen	  to	  this	   item	  beyond	  the	   level	  of	  textual	  debate.	  The	  video	   itself	   is	  an	  utterance	  -­‐	  recalling	  
Panagia’s	   use	   of	   the	   term	   -­‐	   entirely	   free	   from	   semantic	  meaning.	   Its	   power	   lies	   in	   its	   immediate	  
affective	  impact,	  produced	  through	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  sound	  language	  of	  horror	  films	  and	  the	  
possibility	   that	   the	  monstrous	  –	  however	   fake-­‐looking	   -­‐	  might	  actually	  be	   real.	  As	  with	  any	  horror	  
film,	   it	   held	   a	   strong	   fascination	   for	  many	   people	   we	   knew,	   and	   there	  was	   seductive	   pleasure	   in	  
viewing	  it.	  A	  part	  of	  the	  video’s	  power	  lay	  also	  in	  its	  openness	  to	  semantic	  interpretation.	  This	  was	  a	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juxtaposition	   of	   a	   Hollywoodesque	   soundtrack	   and	   video	   images	   of	   a	   Malaysian	   freakshow:	   two	  
disparate	  items,	  free	  floating	  on	  the	  world-­‐wide	  web,	  neither	  with	  any	  obvious	  relationship	  to	  Islam.	  
Only	   through	   the	   rumours	   which	   accrued	   around	   the	   video	   did	   any	   religious	   meaning	   become	  
attached	   to	   it.	  We	  also	  need	   to	   listen	   attentively	   to	   this	   noisy,	  messy,	   orally	   transmitted	  world	  of	  
rumours.	  
State	  media	  have	  frequently	  conflated	  media	  events	  like	  this	  one	  with	  what	  they	  term	  online	  jihadist	  
propaganda.	   In	  autumn	  2013,	   for	  example,	  a	  news	  report	  on	  a	  new	  crackdown	  on	  religious	  media	  
stated	  that:	  
Xinjiang	   police	  were	   investigating	   256	   people	   for	   spreading	   ‘destabilising	   rumours’	   online,	  
the	  Xinjiang	  Daily	  newspaper	  said.	  Of	  those,	  139	  spread	  rumours	  about	  jihad,	  or	  Muslim	  holy	  
war,	  or	  other	  religious	  ideas.	  More	  than	  100	  had	  been	  detained.9	  
A	  brilliant	  mixture	  of	   the	  highly	  precise	   figures	   and	   the	  extremely	   vague	  delineation	  of	  what	   they	  
refer	  to,	  this	  report	  suggests	  that	  what	  state	  media	  refers	  to	  as	  extremist	  terrorism,	  or	  jihad,	  often	  
subsumes	  a	  far	  wider	  set	  of	  religious	  dispositions	  that	  the	  state	  regards	  as	  potentially	  threatening	  to	  
stability.	   Thus,	   the	   snake-­‐monkey-­‐woman,	   like	  many	   other	   items	   of	   religious	  media,	   is	   subsumed	  
under	  the	  rubric	  of	  jihadi	  propaganda.	  Another	  incident	  that	  occurred	  in	  Ürümchi	  a	  few	  years	  earlier,	  
in	  2009,	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  inter-­‐ethnic	  violence	  illustrates	  all	  too	  vividly	  why	  rumours	  might	  be	  
so	   alarming	   to	   the	   Xinjiang	   authorities.	   In	   September	   2009,	   a	   crowd	   of	   Han	   Chinese	  marched	   to	  
demand	  government	  action	  against	  Uyghurs	  after	  widespread	  rumours	  that	  Uyghurs	  were	  stabbing	  
Hans	  with	  hypodermic	  needles	   infected	  with	  H.I.V.10	  In	  his	   study	  of	   rioting	   crowds	  and	   interethnic	  
violence	  in	  India,	  Stanley	  Tambiah	  describes	  rumours	  as	  eminently	  oral	  utterances;	  they	  circulate	  at	  
high	   velocity	   by	  word	   of	  mouth,	   aided	   today	   by	   the	   Internet	   and	   smartphones,	   and	   they	   are	   the	  
currency	  of	  mass	  movements.	  Rumours	  generally	  appear	  anonymous	   in	  origin,	  and	  by	  their	  nature	  
they	  cannot	  be	  traced	  to	  definite	  culpable	  sources.	  Crowds	  are	  highly	  suggestible	  to	  rumours,	  which	  
can	  rouse	  them	  to	  a	  collective	  state	  of	  intensified	  passions	  in	  which	  they	  may	  commit	  acts	  normally	  
unthinkable	  to	  them	  as	  individuals	  (Tambiah	  1996:	  281).	  	  
Rumours,	   impelled	   by	   affective	   force,	   have	   considerable	   power	   to	   transform	   not	   only	   temporary	  
states	  of	  mind	  but	  also	  more	  long-­‐lasting	  ways	  of	  being.	  The	  snake-­‐monkey-­‐woman	  is	  threatening	  to	  
the	   state	   on	   two	   levels:	   she	   defies	   reason	   and	   rational	   debate,	   and	   she	   viscerally	   promotes	   the	  
simplest	   and	  most	   fundamental	   religious	   disposition,	   that	   of	   being	   	   ‘God-­‐fearing’	   (‘men	   Khodadin	  
qoqaymen’),	   thus	   diluting	   fear	   of	   the	   state’s	   own	   temporal	   power.	   Several	   of	   the	   village	   women	  
made	  this	  opposition	  between	  state	  and	  religious	  power	  explicit,	  such	  as	  in	  this	  case	  where	  a	  woman	  
explains	  why	  she	  has	  not	  given	  up	  the	  currently	  illegal	  practice	  of	  providing	  religious	  instruction	  for	  
children:	  
I	  was	   leading	  prayers	  one	  night	  and	   the	  police	  caught	  us.	   I	  was	  with	  one	  girl	   from	  Ürümchi,	  
and	   two	   from	   Aqsu.	   They	   put	   me	   in	   jail	   for	   15	   days.	   After	   that	   Allah	   gave	   me	   even	   more	  
strength	  and	  faith	  and	  I	  became	  even	  stronger.	  We	  shouldn’t	  be	  afraid	  of	  them	  because	  Allah	  
said	  on	  the	  Day	  of	  Judgement	  [qiyamät	  küni]	  even	  a	  mother	  will	  forget	  her	  baby.	  
	  
Style	  and	  ideology	  in	  Qur’anic	  recitation	  
By	  far	  the	  most	  dominant	  sounded	  practice	  in	  the	  religious	  media	  circulating	  in	  Xinjiang	  in	  2012	  was	  
the	  recited	  Qur’an:	  a	  sounded	  practice	  seemingly	  far	  removed	  from	  horror	  sound	  tracks	  but	  as	  we	  
have	   seen	   often	   juxtaposed	  with	   them	   in	   the	   Islamic	  media	   circulating	   this	   region.	   Recordings	   of	  
Qur’anic	  recitation	  came	  from	  many	  different	  sources,	  in	  many	  different	  styles,	  from	  short	  teaching	  
videos	   produced	   by	   the	   Islamic	   Institute	   in	   Ürümchi,	   to	   imported	   VCDs	   from	   Pakistan	   and	   locally	  
produced	   discs	   of	   Internet	   downloads;	   lengthy	   high	   quality	   recordings	   in	   the	   ornate	   ‘classical’	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Egyptian	  style,	  and	  the	  simpler	  but	  emotive	  Saudi	  style,	  thick	  with	  reverb.	  Sometimes	  the	  recitation	  
overlaid	   gruesome	   images	   of	   death	   and	   decay,	   but	  more	   often	   it	  was	   accompanied	   by	   images	   of	  
skies	  or	  flowers,	  or	  the	  faithful	  praying	  in	  huge	  North	  African	  mosques.	  	  
For	  Muslims,	   the	   Qur’an	   is	   Divine	   Revelation,	   the	   fixed	   Speech	   of	   God	   as	   revealed	   in	   the	   Arabic	  
language	   to	   the	  Prophet	  Muhammad.	  The	  Qur’an	  as	   text	   is	   inseparable	   from	   its	   recitation	  as	   solo	  
vocal	   performance;	   Muslims	   rarely	   read	   the	   Qur’an	   without	   reciting	   it.	   For	   non-­‐Arabic	   speaking	  
Muslims,	  arguably,	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  sound	  of	  the	  recited	  Qur’an	  takes	  even	  greater	  precedence	  
over	   the	   lexical	   meanings	   which	   may	   be	   barely	   understood.	   Hirschkind	   suggests	   that	   ways	   of	  
sounding	  and	  hearing	  the	  Qur’an	  are	  central	  to	  the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  pious	  disposition	  even	  for	  those	  
who	  find	  the	  language	  unintelligible	  on	  a	  semantic	  level.	  Numerous	  verses	  in	  the	  Qur’an	  describe	  the	  
effects	  of	  godly	  speech	  on	  the	  rightly	  disposed	   listener.	  Surah	  Al-­‐Anfal	   (Q8:	  2)	   for	  example,	  states:	  
‘Believers	   are	   only	   they	   whose	   hearts	   tremble	   whenever	   God	   is	   mentioned,	   and	   whose	   faith	   is	  
strengthened	  whenever	  his	  messages	  are	  conveyed	  unto	  them’	  (Hirschkind	  2006:	  75).	  In	  her	  seminal	  
study	  of	  Qur’anic	  recitation	  in	  Egypt,	  Kristina	  Nelson	  argues	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  reciter	  is	  not	  only	  to	  
transmit	  the	  meanings	  of	  the	  text	  but	  also	  to	  stir	  the	  hearts	  of	  listeners	  with	  those	  meanings	  (Nelson	  
2001:	  100).	  
Some	  aspects	  of	  Qur’anic	  recitation	  are	  governed	  by	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  called	  tajwid,	  but	  other	  aspects	  	  -­‐	  
mainly	   the	   more	   melodic	   and	   expressive	   aspects	   of	   recitation	   -­‐	   are	   not	   fixed	   by	   tajwid.	   Thus,	  
experienced	  listeners	  can	  immediately	  identify	  regional	  styles	  of	  recitation,	  and	  even	  the	  individual	  
style	  of	  a	  well-­‐known	  reciter,	  whose	  style	  may	  be	  appreciated	  for	  its	  expressive	  power	  and	  ability	  to	  
stir	  the	  heart:	  at	  once	  an	  aesthetic	  and	  religious	  experience.	  Through	  the	  course	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  
particular	   styles	   of	   Qur’anic	   recitation	   have	   achieved	   global	   hegemony	   through	   systems	   of	  
technology	  and	  political	  patronage,	  and	  they	  have	  become	  linked	  to	  particular	  Islamic	  ideologies.	  
In	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  developments	  in	  recording	  technology	  permitted	  the	  global	  spread	  of	  what	  
is	  now	  regarded	  as	  the	  classical	  Egyptian	  style,	  as	  Eygpt’s	  state-­‐owned	  recording	  company	  SonoCairo	  
produced	  a	  series	  of	  star	  reciters,	  among	  them	  Abdul	  Basit	  'Abd	  us-­‐Samad	  and	  Khalil	  al	  Hussari,	  for	  
world-­‐wide	   export	   (Frishkopf	   2009:	   79-­‐83).	   Renowned	   for	   their	   artistry,	   their	   recitation	   style	  
featured	  dramatic	  melodic	  ornamentation	  and	  ecstatic	  techniques	  of	  repetition	  and	  modulation.	  In	  
recordings	  of	  their	  live	  performances,	  sighs	  and	  shouts	  of	  appreciation	  from	  the	  audience	  are	  often	  
audible.	   In	   the	  1980s,	  a	  new	  style	  of	   recitation	  began	   to	  compete	  with	   this	  established	  style	  via	  a	  
new	  media	  form.	  Saudi	  New	  Islam	  was	  widely	  promoted	  through	  cassette	  recordings	  of	  sermons	  and	  
recitation.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  ornate	  Egyptian	  style,	  the	  Saudi	  style	  is	  typically	  rapid	  and	  simple.	  The	  
heavy	  reverb	  used	  in	  its	  recordings	  indexes	  the	  acoustics	  of	  its	  most	  common	  live	  venues,	  the	  huge	  
mosques	  at	  Mecca	  and	  Medina.	  Frishkopf	  argues	  that	  this	  Saudi	  style	  of	  Qur’anic	  recitation	  sonically	  
promotes	  reformist-­‐revivalist	   Islamic	   ideology.	   It	  expresses	  a	  direct	  relationship	  to	  God,	  one	  that	   is	  
affectively	   colored	   by	   fear,	   awe,	   and	   repentance.	   This	   ideology	   opposes	   the	   traditional	   Sufi-­‐
influenced	  mystical-­‐aesthetic	  values	  of	  Egyptian	  Islamic	  practice	  (Frishkopf	  2009:	  100).	  	  
What	   happens	   when	   these	  Middle	   Eastern	   recitation	   styles	   come	   to	   Xinjiang?	   Do	   the	   ideological	  
attachments	   they	   signal	   in	   Egypt	   remain	   true	   for	   Uyghur	   listeners?	   Can	   this	   semiotic	   system	  
proposed	  by	  Frishkopf	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  Qur’anic	  recitation	  is	  listened	  to,	  interpreted	  
and	  reproduced	  in	  Uyghur	  society?	  
	  
Abdul	  Basit	  comes	  to	  Aqsu	  
In	  Uyghur	  society,	  contexts	  of	  recitation	  include	  Friday	  prayers	  and	  daily	  recitation	  of	  the	  complete	  
Qur’an	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   thirty	   days	   of	   Ramadan	   in	   the	   larger	   Friday	   mosques.	   It	   is	   also	  
practised	  during	  funerals	  and	  other	  life-­‐cycle	  rituals	  in	  the	  home.	  Ramadan	  may	  also	  be	  marked	  by	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practice	   of	   inviting	   the	   mosque	   community	   (jäma’ät)	   to	   an	   evening	   meal	   (iptar)	   followed	   by	   a	  
khätmä	  –	  a	  complete	  simultaneous	  recitation	  by	  thirty	  reciters	  of	  the	  thirty	  juz	  of	  the	  Qur’an.	  Similar	  
rituals	   of	   hospitality	   and	   recitation	   are	   performed	   for	  mäwlud	   -­‐	   celebrations	   of	   the	   birth	   of	   the	  
Prophet	   Muhammad.	   Another	   form	   of	   recitation	   in	   the	   home	   is	   performed	   by	   women	   ritual	  
specialists	  (büwi)	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  healing	  or	  expulsion,	  women’s	  funerals,	  or	  to	  mark	  the	  night	  of	  
Barat	  (the	  14th	  night	  of	  the	  Islamic	  month	  of	  Shabān).	  Sufi	  groups	  also	  recite	  from	  the	  Qur’an	  as	  part	  
of	   their	   sama	   rituals	   in	   officially	   recognized	   lodges	   (khaniqa)	   or	   in	   members’	   homes.	   Qur’anic	  
recitation	  is	  taught	  in	  the	  Islamic	  Institute,	  and	  since	  the	  1990s,	  the	  Islamic	  Association	  has	  organized	  
Qur’anic	  competitions	  at	  regional	  and	  national	  level.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  recordings	  of	  recitation	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  cassettes,	  VCDs,	  mobile	  phone	  apps,	  and	  other	  gadgets	  have	  been	  sold	   in	  Uyghur	  bazaars	  
both	  openly	  and	  covertly	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  and	  pilgrims	  returning	  from	  the	  hajj	  commonly	  give	  
cassettes	  of	  Qur’anic	  recitation	  as	  gifts.	  	  
During	  fieldwork	  in	  2012,	  I	  discussed	  recitation	  style	  with	  the	  Damolla,	  an	  officially	  appointed	  cleric	  
of	  the	  chief	  mosque	  of	  a	  county	  town	  in	  southern	  Xinjiang.	  In	  the	  1980s,	  China’s	  Islamic	  Association	  
began	   to	   establish	   relations	   with	   Islamic	   centres	   of	   learning	   in	   the	  Middle	   East.	   Up	   to	   this	   time,	  
according	   to	   the	  Damolla,	   the	   style	   or	   ‘voice’	   (awaz)	   of	  Uyghur	   recitation	  was	   local,	   but	   from	   the	  
1980s	  foreign	  styles,	  the	  ‘Arab	  voice’	  started	  to	  be	  introduced:	  	  
In	  our	  county,	  my	  father’s	  teacher	  (ustaz)	  was	  the	  first	  to	  introduce	  the	  Arab	  qira’ät	  [recitation	  
style]	  from	  Saudi	  Arabia.	  He	  studied	  for	  seven	  years	   in	  Mecca.	  Now	  the	  local	  style	  has	  gone.	  
Everyone	  uses	  the	  Arab	  style	  …	  Why?	  It’s	  fine	  to	  lose	  our	  own	  style,	  the	  Arab	  style	  is	  good.	  The	  
whole	  Muslim	   world	   is	   using	   it.	   We	   didn’t	   adopt	   it	   before	   because	   links	   were	   weaker,	   we	  
didn’t	  have	  so	  many	  opportunities	  to	  travel.	  
Yet	   Saudi	  Arabia	   is	   clearly	  not	   the	  only	   source	   for	  Uyghur	   reciters	   to	  access	   ‘Arab	   styles’.	  Damolla	  
also	  waxed	  lyrical	  about	  the	  recitation	  of	  Abdul	  Basit,	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  20th	  century	  exponents	  of	  
the	  Egyptian	  classical	  style:	  	  
We	  are	   all	   following	  Abdul	  Basit;	  Muslims	   in	  China,	   and	  across	   the	  whole	   Islamic	  world.	   It’s	  
fashionable	  to	  copy	  his	  qira’ät,	  his	  tajwid,	  his	  awaz	  [vocal	  style].	  No-­‐one	  has	  yet	  been	  born	  to	  
take	  his	  place.	  ..	  When	  he	  reads	  a	  verse	  (ayat),	  every	  word	  is	  in	  its	  proper	  place.	  His	  voice	  and	  
breath	  last	  a	  long	  time.	  I	  don’t	  know	  any	  better	  than	  him.	  …	  I	  am	  also	  trying	  to	  follow	  his	  style	  
at	  the	  moment.	  When	  I	  recite	  in	  his	  style	  and	  my	  voice	  sounds	  like	  him	  people	  value	  it	  more;	  it	  
strengthens	  my	  reputation.	  
It	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  discussion	  that	  Middle	  Eastern	  styles	  are	  entering	  Uyghur	  society,	  and	  that	  they	  
are	   highly	   valued,	   even	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   are	   supplanting	   local	   styles.	   Trained	   reciters	   like	  
Damolla	  also	  possess	  detailed	  knowledge	  of	  specific	  styles	  and	  individual	  reciters.	  In	  order	  to	  better	  
understand	   the	   meanings	   carried	   by	   new	   styles	   of	   Qur’anic	   recitation	   as	   they	   are	   absorbed	   into	  
Uyghur	   society,	   we	   need	   to	   listen	   in	   detail	   to	   how	   these	   sounds	   are	   reproduced,	   sounded	   and	  
embodied	   in	   specific	   contexts	   of	   Uyghur	   religious	   life.	   In	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   discuss	   a	   form	   of	  
women’s	  ritual	  practice	  which	  was	  central	  to	  religious	  life	  in	  the	  village	  where	  I	  conducted	  the	  bulk	  
of	  my	   fieldwork,	   focusing	  on	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  new	  styles	  of	  Qur’anic	   recitation	  are	  entering	   this	  
practice,	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  practitioners	  interpret	  them.	  	  
	  
Qur’anic	  recitation	  in	  women’s	  home-­‐based	  rituals	  
Uyghur	   women	   are	  marginalized	   by	   official	   Islam	   in	   Xinjiang	   –	   excluded	   from	  mosques	   and	   from	  
study	  at	   the	   Islamic	   Institutes	   -­‐	  but	   they	  may	  play	  a	  central	   role	   in	  home-­‐based	   religious	  practices	  
through	   participation	   in	   the	   extraordinary	   noisy	   rituals	   called	   khätmä	   which	   are	   led	   by	   ritual	  
specialists	   called	   büwi.	  Büwi	   women	   prepare	   the	   bodies	   of	   deceased	  women	   for	   burial,	   and	   lead	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gatherings	   of	   women	   for	   vigils	   (tünäk)	   following	   a	   death.	   They	   are	   invited	   to	   people’s	   homes	   to	  
recite	  and	  pray	  in	  order	  to	  dispel	  misfortune	  or	  heal	   illness,	  and	  they	  perform	  large-­‐scale	  rituals	  at	  
key	  points	  in	  the	  Islamic	  calendar.	  The	  role	  of	  büwi	   is	  often	  thought	  to	  be	  attached	  to	  the	  wives	  of	  
male	  religious	  clerics,	  but	  the	  four	  women	  I	  worked	  with	  during	  fieldwork	  were	  married	  to	  peasant	  
farmers	  or	  small	  traders,	  and	  had	  either	  inherited	  the	  role	  from	  their	  mother	  or	  had	  found	  their	  own	  
path	   towards	   the	   role	  of	   ritual	   specialist.	   Their	   rituals	   involve	  Qur’anic	   recitation,	   singing	   religious	  
hikmät	   lyrics,	  rhythmic	  repetitive	  dhikr	  chanting,	  and	  a	  circling	  form	  of	  sama	  dancing	  (Harris	  2014).	  
Notions	  of	  faith,	  sin	  and	  redemption,	  and	  emotional	  expression	  -­‐	  specifically	  weeping	  -­‐	  are	  central	  to	  
the	  efficacy	  of	  their	  ritual	  practice	  and	  to	  the	  büwi’s	  high	  status	  within	  village	  society.	  As	  the	  senior	  
büwi	  in	  our	  fieldwork	  area	  explained:	  
[Büwi	  are]	  women	  who	  really	  believe	  in	  Allah,	  that	  Allah	  created	  us.	  If	  people	  doubt	  their	  faith,	  
and	  wonder	  if	  is	  it	  true	  or	  false	  then	  they	  will	  not	  cry	  and	  the	  sin	  will	  not	  be	  relieved.	  
I	  attended	  and	  recorded	  two	  of	  these	  rituals,	   in	  2009	  and	  in	  2012,	  during	  which	  the	  same	  büwi	   -­‐	  a	  
young	  woman	  whom	  I’ll	  call	  Aygul	  who	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  powerful	  ritual	  practitioner	  –	  recited	  from	  
the	  Qur’an	  in	  styles	  which	  were	  evidently	  linked	  to	  the	  sound	  world	  of	  the	  Middle	  East.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Women	  gather	  in	  front	  of	  a	  village	  house	  after	  a	  khätmä.	  Courtesy	  of	  Aziz	  Isa	  
The	  2009	   ritual	  which	   I	   attended	   is	   normally	   performed	  on	   the	  night	   of	   Barat	  when,	   according	   to	  
traditional	  Uyghur	  belief,	   the	  good	  and	  bad	  deeds	  of	   the	  dead	  are	  weighed	   in	   the	  balance	   (Bellér-­‐
Hann	  2008:	  355-­‐360).	   It	   is	  a	  ritual	  of	   intercession,	  pleading	  for	  the	  alleviation	  of	  sin,	  performed	  on	  
behalf	   of	   the	   whole	   community,	   and	   the	   recited	   verses	   from	   the	   Qur’an	   and	   prayers	   dwell	   on	  
themes	   of	   death,	   judgement,	   and	   forgiveness.	   This	   is	   one	   of	   the	   ritual	   ‘good	   deeds’	   (sawab)	  
characteristic	   of	   rural	   Uyghur	   Islam,	   through	   which	   the	   living	   are	   connected	   with	   the	   dead	   on	   a	  
family	  and	  communal	   level,	  and	  which	  serve	   to	  underpin	   the	  deep-­‐seated	  reciprocal	   ties	  of	  village	  
society.	  The	  women	  recited	  a	  series	  of	   repetitive	  prayers,	  dhikr,	   led	  by	  senior	  büwi	  of	   the	   locality,	  
gradually	   increasing	   in	   intensity	  over	   the	  course	  of	  an	  hour	  until	  many	  of	  them	  were	  weeping	  and	  
some	   fell	   into	   trance.	   Finally	   Aygul	   began	   to	   recite	   Surah	   Al	   Rahman	   (Q55).	   Her	   recitation	   was	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beautifully	  voiced	  and,	  unusually	  amongst	  the	  büwi,	  faithful	  to	  correct	  Qur’anic	  Arabic	  pronunciation.	  
She	  was	  also	  recognisably	  following	  the	  ‘classical’	  20th	  century	  Egyptian	  style,	  and	  her	  phrases	  were	  
answered	  by	  the	  assembled	  women	  with	  sobs	  and	  gasps.	  
When	   I	   returned	   in	   2012,	   I	   sat	   with	   Aygul	   to	   listen	   back	   to	   the	   recording	   of	   this	   ritual,	   and	   we	  
discussed	  recitation	  style.	  She	  told	  me:	  
I	   learned	   tajwid	   from	   a	   damolla	   (religious	   cleric),	   a	   young	   guy,	   in	   Kashgar	   …	   If	   you	   don’t	  
pronounce	   the	   words	   properly	   the	   meaning	   is	   lost	   …	   I	   learned	   the	   melody	   (ahang)	   from	  
recordings	  (dai).	  I	  bought	  them	  from	  the	  bazaar	  in	  Ürümchi.	  I	  just	  listened	  to	  them	  a	  couple	  of	  
times.	  I	  like	  imitating	  people,	  so	  I	  picked	  it	  up	  easily.	  I	  am	  illiterate,	  and	  I	  never	  went	  to	  school,	  
but	  I	  studied	  the	  Qur’an	  for	  twelve	  years,	  so	  I	  can	  copy	  a	  voice	  when	  I	  hear	  it	  …	  I	  learned	  this	  
one	  from	  a	  recording	  of	  Sadiq	  Ali	  [a	  prominent,	  Egyptian-­‐trained,	  Pakistani	  reciter].	  He’s	  a	  top	  
student	  of	  Abdul	  Basit.	  	  
We	  also	  talked	  about	  the	  Saudi	  style	  of	  recitation.	  I	  played	  her	  a	  recording	  of	  the	  well-­‐known	  Saudi	  
preacher	  and	  reciter,	  Abdurahman	  Sudais.	   ‘Ah	  yes’,	  she	  said.	   ‘I’ve	   learned	  him	  too.	   I’ll	   recite	  some	  
for	  you	  at	  our	  next	  ritual.’	  
This	   ritual,	   led	  by	  Aygul	  herself	   in	  August	  2012,	  was	  performed	   to	  help	  a	   village	  woman	  who	  was	  
recovering	  from	  a	  major	  operation.	  A	  bowl	  of	  water	  was	  placed	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  circle,	  and	  after	  
the	   conclusion	   of	   each	   set	   of	  dhikr	   the	  women	   blew	   into	   it	  with	   a	   noisy	   ‘fshew’,	   transferring	   the	  
blessings	  earned	  by	  their	  recitation	  into	  the	  water,	  which	  would	  later	  be	  drunk	  by	  the	  patient.	  The	  
ritual	   followed	   the	   normal	   pattern	   of	   rising	   emotional	   intensity,	   weeping	   and	   trancing.	   At	   its	  
conclusion,	  Aygul	   recited	  Surah	  Al-­‐Fatiha	   (Q1),	   in	   a	   slow,	  portentous	  manner,	   clearly	   imitating	   the	  
Saudi	  style	  of	  recitation.	  
Aygul	  inserts	  into	  her	  ritual	  practice	  both	  the	  Egyptian	  and	  the	  Saudi	  styles	  of	  recitation.	  If	  we	  follow	  
Frishkopf’s	  semiotic	  model	  we	  might	  think	  it	  highly	  appropriate	  that	  the	  Egyptian	  style	  -­‐	  with	  its	  links	  
to	  mystic,	  Sufi-­‐influenced	  modes	  of	   Islam	   -­‐	   should	  be	  brought	   into	   the	  context	  of	   this	   ritual	  which	  
also	   draws	   upon	   Sufi	   practices	   of	  dhikr	   and	   sama	   dance.	   The	   inclusion	   of	   the	   Saudi	   style,	   on	   the	  
other	   hand,	   may	   strike	   us	   as	   bizarre.	   Here	   is	   a	   style	   linked	   to	   strongly,	   even	   violently,	   anti-­‐Sufi	  
ideology.	  This	  is	  a	  form	  of	  Islam	  that	  preaches,	  above	  all,	  a	  direct	  relationship	  with	  God,	  and	  as	  such	  
is	  strongly	  opposed	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  ritual	  intercession	  which	  these	  büwi	  are	  engaged	  in.	  	  
The	  ritual	  practices	  of	   the	  büwi,	  along	  with	  other	   ‘traditional’	  or	   ‘local’	  practices,	  have	  been	  much	  
criticized	  by	  Uyghur	  reformists	  over	  the	  past	  two	  decades.	  Reformists	  have	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  no	  
Qur’anic	   basis	   for	   rituals	   such	   as	   these;	   they	   regard	   them	  as	   ‘un-­‐Islamic’	   innovations	   (bidät),	   local	  
traditions	  and	  ‘superstition’	  (khurapatliq)	  from	  which	  Islam	  should	  be	  ‘purified’	  (Schrode	  1999).	  Why	  
would	   Aygul	   draw	   upon	   this	   style	   if	   it	   retained	   its	   semiotic	   associations	   with	   this	   form	   of	   Islam?	  
Surely	   this	   is	   a	   case	   of	   radical	   semantic	   and	   affective	   drift;	   the	   kind	   of	   disjuncture	   of	   sounds	   and	  
meanings	   that	   is	  often	  remarked	  upon	   in	  studies	  of	   the	  global	  circulation	  of	  music	   (Erlmann	  1999:	  
187).	   It	   appears	   that	   as	   the	  disembodied	   sounds	  of	  Qur’anic	   recitation	   circulate	   around	   the	   globe	  
with	   increasing	  ease	  and	  rapidity,	   their	  semiotic	  meanings	  are	  similarly	  detached	  and	  their	  sounds	  
are	  re-­‐signified.	  
Many	  observers	  of	  the	  Islamic	  world	  have	  pitted	  a	  supposedly	  tolerant	  and	  hybrid	  local	  Islam	  against	  
the	  purifying	  practices	  of	  modernist	  or	  reformist	  individuals	  and	  groups	  (Soares	  and	  Osella	  2009:	  8).	  
But	  it	   is	  difficult	  to	  make	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  distinction	  between	  ‘orthodox’	  Islam	  and	  Sufi-­‐influenced	  Islam	  
in	   Xinjiang.	   Sufi	   rituals	   provide	   one	   dimension	   of	   a	   broad	   spectrum	   of	   religious	   beliefs	   that	  
individuals	  may	  draw	  upon.	  Senior	  religious	  leaders	  in	  mosques	  and	  madrassahs	  throughout	  Xinjiang	  
have	  been	  known	  to	  undertake	   leading	   roles	  within	  Sufi	  orders	   (täriqät),	  and	   the	  Sufi	  orders	  have	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historically	  been	  closely	   tied	   to	  political	  power.	  This	  blurring	  of	  boundaries	  and	   factions	   continues	  
today.	  
The	  ritual	  practices	  of	  rural	  Uyghur	  women	  are	  highly	  adaptable	  and	  responsive	  to	  social	  change,	  as	  
their	  practitioners	  -­‐	  even	  within	  their	  remote	  villages	  -­‐	  confront	  and	  engage	  with	  the	  complexities	  of	  
contemporary	  globalized	  society.	  Although	  their	  practice	  has	  clearly	  absorbed	  elements	  of	  Sufi	  ritual,	  
büwi	  do	  not	  necessarily	   identify	   themselves	  as	  Sufis,	   indeed	  most	  of	   the	  women	   I	   spoke	  with	  had	  
little	  awareness	  of	  the	  Sufi	  orders	  that	  are	  active	  in	  Xinjiang	  today.	  Likewise,	  absorbing	  the	  sounds	  of	  
Wahhabism	  does	  not	  necessarily	  denote	  a	  reformist	  attitude.	  For	  Aygul,	  as	  for	  other	  reciters,	  rather	  
than	  indexing	  rival	  ideologies,	  what	  both	  the	  Egyptian	  and	  Saudi	  styles	  index	  is	  modernity.	  ‘Our	  level	  
is	  very	  low’,	  says	  the	  Damolla	  of	  Uyghur	  Qur’anic	  recitation,	  echoing	  the	  prevalent	  state	  discourse	  of	  
development.	  In	  China’s	  Muslim	  communities,	  this	  thirst	  for	  modernity	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  
exclusion	  or	  marginalization	  from	  the	  modernizing	  agenda	  of	  the	  state.	   In	  her	  study	  of	  Hui	  Muslim	  
Chinese	   in	  mid-­‐1990s	  Xi’an,	  Maris	  Boyd	  Gillette	   lays	  emphasis	  on	  the	   links	  between	  modernization	  
and	  the	  new	  forms	  of	  Islam	  penetrating	  this	  community	  –	  which	  she	  terms	  ‘Arabization’:	  	  
Like	  modernization,	  Arabization	  included	  a	  cluster	  of	  ideas	  about	  development	  for	  Muslims.	  …	  
although	  proponents	  of	  Arabization	  used	  the	  language	  of	  authenticity	  and	  the	  ‘original’	  Islam	  
to	   legitimate	   the	   changes	   they	   proposed,	   Arabization	   also	   incorporated	   elements	   of	  
modernization	   as	   exemplified	   by	   the	   oil-­‐rich	   countries	   of	   the	   Middle	   East.	   Arabization	  
provided	  residents	  with	  an	  alternative	  ideological	  scale	  on	  which	  to	  evaluate	  themselves	  and	  a	  
scale	  of	  development	   that	  excluded	   the	  CCP	  government	  and	   the	  Han	  minzu.	   (Boyd	  Gillette	  
2000:	  76)	  
Aygul,	   likewise,	   feels	   the	   need	   to	   make	   herself	   strong	   and	   to	   make	   herself	   modern,	   in	   part	   in	  
response	  to	  pressure	  from	  state	  religious	  policies,	  in	  part	  in	  response	  to	  criticism	  from	  reformists.11	  
‘Now	  our	  rituals	  are	  even	  stronger	  than	  before’,	  she	  said,	  ‘There	  are	  restrictions	  on	  gatherings,	  so	  it	  
is	   harder	   to	   meet,	   but	   we	   understand	   better	   than	   before.	   Our	   heads	   are	   like	   computers;	   more	  
developed.’	  Cyborg-­‐like,	  magpie-­‐like,	  Aygul	  mimetically	  absorbs	  and	  deploys	  these	  ‘foreign	  styles’	  of	  
recitation	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  very	  local	  form	  of	  ritual.	  	  
	  
Conclusions	  
The	   case	   studies	   in	   this	   article	   reveal	   some	   of	   the	   complexity	   of	   the	   interactions	   between	   local	  
systems	  of	  meaning	  and	  experience	  and	  global	  forms	  of	  religious	  transformation.	  By	  listening	  in	  on	  
the	  new	  religious	  modalities	  that	  are	  circulating	   in	  Uyghur	  society,	  and	  by	  paying	  attention	  to	  how	  
people	   listen	   to	   them,	   we	   can	   begin	   to	   perceive	   how	   they	   help	   to	   construct	   new	   ways	   of	   being	  
Muslim	   and	   being	   Uyghur	   in	   Xinjiang.	   Contemporary	   debates	   on	   ways	   of	   being	   Muslim	   across	  
contemporary	   Xinjiang	   are	   complex,	   messy	   and	   confused.	   This	   is	   in	   part	   due	   to	   the	   severe	  
restrictions	  on	  religious	  education	  and	  religious	  media	   imposed	  by	   the	  state,	  which	  make	  much	  of	  
this	  knowledge	  an	  illicit	  pursuit,	  and	  thus	  impede	  the	  development	  of	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  the	  
different	   ideological	   strands.	   Likewise,	   the	   Xinjiang	   authorities	   do	   not	   appear	   to	   differentiate	  
between	   different	   ideological	   forms	   of	   Islam.	   At	   the	   time	   of	   writing,	   many	   kinds	   of	   religious	  
gatherings,	   including	   those	   of	   the	   büwi,	   are	   outlawed,	   and	   the	   büwi	   themselves	   are	   regularly	  
harassed	  by	  the	  local	  police,	  accused	  of	  conducting	  illegal	  religious	  activities	  which,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  
are	  regularly	  conflated	  with	  extremism	  and	  terrorism	  in	  state	  media	  reports	  (Harris	  2013).	  
The	   use	   of	   religious	   media	   in	   Xinjiang	   exemplifies	   the	   processes	   of	   decontextualization	   and	  
abstraction	   typical	   of	   digitally	  mediated	  productions.	  What	   is	   beyond	  doubt	   is	   the	   thirst	   for	   these	  
new	  ways	  of	  being	  Muslim.	  The	  religious	  utterances	  of	  rural	  Uyghur	  women	  are	  performed	  in	  active	  
dialogue	  with	  global	  flows	  of	  Islamic	  ideologies,	  and	  also	  with	  current	  social	  and	  ideological	  change	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within	  Xinjiang.	  State	  media	  depicts	  Islamic	  media	  imported	  from	  outside	  in	  Xinjiang	  as	  purveyors	  of	  
religious	   extremism	   and	   promoting	   terrorism.	   The	   new	   religious	  media	   is	   undoubtedly	  weakening	  
the	  position	  of	  the	  traditional	  interpreters	  of	  Islam,	  notably	  the	  authority	  of	  Xinjiang’s	  official	  imams,	  
but	  what	  state	  media	  refers	  to	  as	  extremist	  or	  jihadi	  propaganda,	  often	  subsumes	  a	  far	  wider	  set	  of	  
religious	  dispositions	  that	  the	  state	  regards	  as	  potentially	  threatening	  to	  stability.	  	  
Equally,	  when	  Uyghurs	   encounter	   new	   forms	   of	   sounded	   practice	   and	   reproduce	   them	   as	   part	   of	  
their	   own	   practices,	   they	   resignify	   them.	   Thus,	   for	   rural	   Uyghur	   women,	   the	   Egyptian	   and	   Saudi	  
recitation	  styles	  are	  not	  symbols	  of	  opposing	  religious	   ideologies;	  they	  are	  new	  tools	  that	  they	  can	  
draw	  on	   to	  strengthen	   their	  own	  religious	  practice.	  They	  are	  symbols	  of	  an	  alternative	  modernity,	  
but	   they	   reflect	   and	   enact	   locally	   produced	   channels	   of	   spiritual	   and	   political	   power.	   In	   fact,	   my	  
research	  shows	  that	  a	  very	  wide	  range	  of	  different	  ideological	  and	  affective	  relationships	  with	  Islam	  
is	  promoted	  through	  the	  available	  media,	  and	  most	  Uyghurs	  who	  consume	  them	  are	  not	  using	  them	  
in	  order	  to	  pursue	  specific	  ideologies.	  It	  would	  seem	  more	  appropriate	  to	  argue	  that	  what	  they	  seek	  
are	  particular	  affective	  religious	  experiences.	  	  
Of	  particular	  note	  are	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  many	  of	  these	  religious	  media	  items	  use	  visceral	  sounds	  and	  
imagery	   to	   communicate	   eschatological	   themes	   of	   suffering,	   death	   and	   judgement.	   These	  
productions	  are	  threatening	  to	  the	  state	  on	  two	  levels:	  they	  defy	  the	  rational	  and	  secular	  project	  of	  
the	   state,	   and	   simply	   through	   their	   promotion	   of	   the	   fundamental	   religious	   disposition	   of	   being	  
‘God-­‐fearing’	   they	   dilute	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   state	   by	   promoting	   an	   alternative,	   more	   powerful	  
sanction.	   These	   forms	   of	   Islamic	   media,	   sometimes	   drawing	   on	   the	   sound	   world	   of	   horror	   films,	  
promote	   a	   visceral	   fear	   of	   God,	   like	   the	   snake-­‐monkey-­‐woman	   discussed	   above	   who	   provides	   a	  
lesson	   for	  women	   in	   the	  monstrousness	  of	   impious	  behaviour.	  The	  state	   reacts	  with	  horror	  at	   the	  
spread	  of	  what	   it	  perceives	  as	  alien,	  anti-­‐modern,	  and	  hence	  threatening	  ways	  of	  being.	   It	   invokes	  
the	  trope	  of	  Islamic	  terror,	  which	  then	  enables	  new	  violence	  to	  be	  unleashed	  against	  the	  supposed	  
terrorists.	  Thus,	  it	  may	  be	  appropriate	  to	  view	  the	  current	  cycle	  of	  violence	  in	  Xinjiang,	  not	  in	  terms	  
of	   an	   ideological	   clash	   between	   radical	   Islam	   and	   the	   Communist	   state,	   but	   as	   a	   dialectical	  
relationship	  between	  two	  opposing	  conceptions	  of	  horror	  and	  modernity:	  each	  one	  the	  product	  of	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1	  I	  spent	  the	  summers	  of	  2006,	  2009,	  and	  2012	  based	  in	  a	  village	  in	  the	  southern	  region	  of	  Aqsu,	  accompanied	  
by	  my	  husband,	  Aziz	  Isa,	  to	  whom	  I	  am	  -­‐	  as	  ever	  -­‐	  indebted	  for	  his	  invaluable	  assistance	  with	  interviews,	  
translation	  and	  research.	  
2	  Waite	  notes	  that	  Sayyid	  Qutb’s	  ‘Signposts	  Along	  the	  Road’,	  which	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  global	  manifesto	  of	  
contemporary	  radical	  Islam,	  and	  various	  works	  by	  the	  Hizb	  ut-­‐Tahir	  theorist	  Taqiuddin	  Nabhani	  have	  been	  
translated	  into	  Uyghur	  and	  informally	  circulated	  within	  Xinjiang	  (Waite	  forthcoming:	  chapter	  2).	  
3	  The	  way	  of	  life	  prescribed	  as	  normative	  for	  Muslims	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  teachings	  and	  practices	  of	  
Muhammad	  and	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Qur’an.	  
4	  A	  conservative	  branch	  of	  Sunni	  Islam	  which	  preaches	  a	  return	  to	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  Islam.	  Wahhabism	  was	  
a	  popular	  revivalist	  movement	  instigated	  by	  an	  eighteenth	  century	  theologian,	  Muhammad	  ibn	  Abd	  al-­‐
Wahhab	  (1703–1792)	  from	  Najd,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  who	  criticized	  the	  moral	  decline	  and	  political	  weakness	  in	  the	  
Arabian	  Peninsula	  and	  condemned	  popular	  cult	  of	  saints	  and	  shrine	  visitation.	  It	  has	  become	  the	  dominant	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form	  of	  Islam	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  and	  is	  widely	  promoted	  around	  the	  world,	  supported	  by	  the	  political	  and	  
financial	  power	  of	  the	  Saudi	  government.	  	  	  
5	  In	  Uyghur	  Islam,	  näzir	  are	  held	  on	  the	  3rd,	  7th	  and	  40th	  day	  and	  one	  year	  after	  death.	  If	  the	  family	  is	  rich	  
then	  the	  whole	  community	  of	  the	  Friday	  mosque	  (jäma’ät)	  are	  invited	  for	  food	  and	  recitation	  of	  the	  Qur’an	  
which	  builds	  up	  religious	  merit	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  deceased.	  Families	  often	  go	  to	  considerable	  expense	  to	  mark	  
the	  status	  of	  deceased	  and	  of	  family.	  
6	  http://www.themorningstarr.co.uk/2010/02/13/snake-­‐with-­‐a-­‐human-­‐head-­‐found-­‐in-­‐
malaysia/#axzz2TpI0JFIk	  (accessed	  20	  May	  2013).	  
7	  Uyghurlarni	  aldawatqan	  sakhta	  möjuzlär	  (The	  fake	  miracles	  confronting	  the	  Uyghurs),	  Jawhar1	  
bbs.alkuyi.com	  (accessed	  28	  June	  2012).	  
8	  The	  Xinjiang	  authorities	  have	  repeatedly	  sought	  to	  blame	  incidents	  of	  violence	  and	  disorder	  on	  this	  
predominantly	  secular,	  human	  rights	  campaigning	  organisation;	  see	  (Millward	  2004	  and	  2009).	  
9	  http://www.euronews.com/newswires/2151506-­‐china-­‐police-­‐target-­‐online-­‐jihad-­‐talk-­‐amid-­‐rumour-­‐
crackdown/	  (accessed	  5	  January	  2014).	  
10	  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/04/world/asia/04china.html?_r=0	  (accessed	  29	  Nov	  2014).	  
11	  Ben	  Hillman	  (2004)	  similarly	  describes	  how	  a	  small	  Hui	  community	  in	  Yunnan	  learned	  lifestyles	  from	  other	  
Muslims	  in	  China	  and	  abroad	  and	  gained	  the	  empowering	  opportunity	  to	  reject	  ‘backward	  minority	  status’.	  
